Biometrics must evolve
Biometrics authenticate presence, not truth. They can confirm that someone is there, but not who that someone really is. Synthetic identities exploit this gap. They walk straight through biometric defenses not by breaking them, but by complying with them. The fraudster becomes the identity. The lie becomes the record. And the system, blind to origin and intent, keeps granting trust to what should never have existed.
Every generation of defense builds a wall. Every generation of fraud learns to tunnel beneath it. AI-driven synthetic identities are simply the latest tunnel. And just as in counterintelligence, where the enemy adapts to our assumptions, fraud evolves in the shadows of predictability.
The battle between fraud and security has always been a contest of adaptation. Biometrics once seemed like the final answer, a technological lock that only a living human could open. But SIFs exposed the truth. Fraud is not stopped by stronger locks, because criminals simply learn to become better locksmiths.
Biometrics were powerful solutions against identity fraud, but synthetic identities are fundamentally different from stolen or impersonated real identities.
Biometrics are effective at verifying that the same person is returning to use an account. They confirm continuity of identity across sessions or transactions by matching a face, fingerprint, voice, or behavioral pattern to a stored biometric template. This makes them useful against account takeover, where fraudsters try to access an already established account belonging to a real person. In that context, biometrics prevent unauthorized access, especially when used with other controls.
In synthetic identity schemes, there is no real person behind the identity to impersonate. The fraudster simply registers their own biometric data during account opening and becomes the legitimate biometric owner of the synthetic identity from day one.
Biometrics can help fraudsters by making the fake identity appear more trustworthy. The fraudster willingly provides their biometrics to strengthen the identity footprint, exploiting biometric verification as a credibility tool. Over weeks or months, the fraudster builds repayment history with small transactions before executing a high-value exit. In such scenarios, biometrics do nothing to prevent the fraud because the criminal is always the same person accessing the account.
Biometric systems cannot solve the core problem in synthetic identity fraud, the absence of a real, verifiable person linked to the identity at the time of account creation. Most biometric systems focus on authentication rather than identity proofing.
They answer the question “Is this the same person?”
They do not answer the question “Is this a real person with a legitimate and lawful identity?”
In some cases, biometrics can be manipulated. Advanced attack methods such as deepfake facial animations, recorded voice samples, AI-generated faces, or presentation attacks using masks can bypass weak liveness detection systems. Although leading biometric vendors are improving antispoofing techniques, attackers are also advancing.
Fraudsters frequently bypass biometrics altogether by exploiting vulnerabilities in account recovery flows or customer support procedures. Many institutions still allow fallback to weaker methods like SMS verification or email resets, which opens a back door that makes biometric controls irrelevant.
A serious defense against synthetic identity fraud requires layered identity proofing, not reliance on a single technology. Biometrics can play a valuable role, but only when integrated into a broader identity risk framework.
Biometrics will evolve, to deal with the next generation of autonomous identity systems
Biometrics face an existential challenge in a world of generative AI. With high-quality deepfakes, AI-generated synthetic faces, and voice cloning, the integrity of face and voice biometrics collapses as a foundation of trust. Even advanced liveness detection can be bypassed by biometric spoofing frameworks.
Biometrics will evolve too, and they will combine biometrics with AI-based identity intelligence. Instead of relying purely on static matching, future systems will evaluate biometric patterns over time. They will analyze behavioural biometrics, micro-expressions, involuntary reactions, voice cadence, neurological signals, and keystroke dynamics. AI-driven liveness detection and biometric anomaly detection will identify patterns that indicate manipulated or AI-generated biometric submissions. The goal is to detect synthetic presence in identity. Fraudsters using deepfake biometrics may be able to fool a single capture moment, but consistency over time leaves forensic patterns detectable by advanced machine learning.
Identity continuity is important. In decentralized and autonomous models, identity must no longer be a one-time verification at onboarding, but a constantly evaluated construct. Biometrics will help bind a digital identity to a single human being across services, providers, and international borders. Instead of a static KYC process, AI systems will perform rolling identity assessments using biometric signals linked to device intelligence, network footprint, emotional consistency, and behavioural history. This persistent identity graph will make it harder for synthetic identities to evolve unnoticed because they will lack the depth and coherence of real human behavioural and biometric history.
The next generation of identity trust must rely on biometric fusion. The AI identity engines will assess whether a biometric belongs to a real human, whether the human is consistently the same person, whether the identity attributes match external realities, and whether behaviour aligns with real-world identity existence. The trust score assigned to a digital identity will come from this fusion, not from biometrics alone.
The technologies change, the battlefield expands, but the deception versus detection contest remains the same. And as long as trust can be forged, this battle will never end. Only the weapons will.